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RIGHT TO RETURN: A CLOSER LOOK
RFX J. ZEDALIS*
1. INTRODUCTION
In an excellent article appearing in a recent issue of this Journal, a
colleague, John Quigley of Ohio State University, argues that a right to
return for Palestinians displaced during the 1967 war exists1 on the
basis of humanitarian law (i.e. law of belligerent occupation), 2 human
rights law,' general international law,4 and United Nations law.5
Though I have long agreed with Professor Quigley's ultimate conclu-
sion on the existence of such a right, it must be recognized that there
are several problems with -basing the right on the foregoing sources. A
thoroughly persuasive argument directed at convincing others that any
of these sources will indeed support the right acknowledges this fact
and sedulously disposes of each problem.
What follows will present what I hope is a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of the essence of Professor Quigley's stated position with re-
gard to the right to return and each of the four sources he invokes, as
well as an identification and appraisal of some of the most significant
problems with establishing those sources as the bases of a right of such
importance. The expectation is that an even stronger case for a right of
return than developed by Quigley will emerge from a candid acknowl-
edgement and analysis of the weaknesses confronting the reliance on
humanitarian law, human rights law, general international law, and
United Nations law as sources of such a right. A lucid and articulate
exposition on any issue always has its place, but one should not lose
sight of the necessity for structured and careful assessment.
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Cutting Fellow (1980-81) and J.S.D.
(1987), Columbia University. While Research Associate (1978-79), International and Compara-
tive Law Program, George Washington University, the author was engaged as a legal consultant
on the preparation of An International Law Analysis of the Major U.N. Resolutions Concerning
the Palestine Question, UN Doc. ST/SG/SER. F/4 (1979), for the United Nations, Office of the
Secretariat. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights. The views expressed herein are entirely those of
the author and are not to be attributed to any institution with which the author is now or has been
affiliated.
1. John Quigley, Family' Reunion and the Right to Return to Occupied Territory, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR L.J. 223 (1992).
2. Id. at 229-31.
3. Id. at 231-34.
4. Id. at 234.
5. Id. at 238-40.
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II. HUMANITARIAN LAW
Professor Quigley states that Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions,' and Article 49 of the Geneva Civilians Convention of 19491 con-
tain terminology that support a right of return for Palestinians.8 Article
43 addresses this by requiring a belligerent occupant to take all mea-
sures in its power to restore and ensure, in the words of the Israeli
Supreme Court itself, order and normal community life, respecting, un-
less absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country occupied.9
Normal community life is seen as implicitly connoting a prohibition on
expulsion, and the directive to respect the laws in force at the time of
occupation is seen as prohibiting any refusal to recognize residency
rights of all entitled to claim them. Article 49 provides additional sup-
port by explicitly proscribing expulsions of protected persons from oc-
cupied territory.' Furthermore, while the entire Civilians Convention
has been found inapplicable to local cases because of the Knesset's re-
fusal to incorporate the provisions into Israeli domestic law, on an in-
ternational level Israel is bound to observe this Convention by virtue of
its status as a state-party."
Several difficulties exist with invoking Articles 43 and 49 as bases for
a right to return. Quigley alludes to an interpretation of the Civilians
Convention as presupposing that territory occupied by a belligerent be
formerly under the "legitimate sovereignty" of another state. 2 If one
accepts that prior to the 1967 war the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
illegitimately controlled by Jordan and Egypt, respectively,' 3 then such
a presupposition entirely undercuts reliance on Article 49. Thus, some-
thing more must be said than simply that this position has not reflected
the views of other states or the positions enunciated in U.N.
6. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277 (1910), 1 Bevans
631 (1968) [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
7. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for sig-
nature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians Convention].
8. Obviously, since the 1949 Civilians Convention post-dated the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, refu-
gees of that conflict would seem unable to rely on Article 49 of that later Convention. But see
QUINCY WRIGHT, THE MIDDLE EAST: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 24 (Isaac Shapiro ed., Oceana Pub-
lications, Inc. 1969), reprinted in 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 119 (Moore ed. 1974) (arguing
applicability to pre-1949 refugees as well).
9. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, at 2306.
10. Civilians Convention, supra note 7, at 3548.
11. Quigley, supra, note 1, at 229-31.
12. Id. at 230 n.53. Of the sources cited for this proposition, the most authoritative is Dr.
Yehuda Z. Blum, former lecturer on international law at Hebrew University and Permanent Rep-
resentative of Israel to the United Nations. Dr. Blum formulated the "legitimate sovereignty"
arguments, later embraced by the Israeli government, for opposing the application of the Civilians
Convention to the West Bank and Gaza. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflec-
tions on the Status of Judea and Santaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968).
13. Blum, supra note 12, at 283-88 (Jordan and Egypt controlled that land as a result of




From the standpoint of the purely legal argument, a couple of rather
straightforward responses can be made to counter the assertion that
Article 49 of the Civilians Convention is inapplicable. The most signifi-
cant is that nowhere in the Civilians Convention, 5 nor in the record of
its negotiation 6 can there be found the requirement of occupation of
lands formerly under the "legitimate sovereignty" of another state. Ar-
ticle 2, second paragraph of the agreement applies the Convention to
belligerent occupation, and its only reference is to territory of a high
Contracting Party. 7 Nothing suggests that this is defined as meaning
land over which a state-party to the Convention has complete and for-
mal title. Indeed, it seems few have doubted the reference may well
apply to lands under a de facto claim to sovereignty, thus encompass-
ing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 8
The eminent good sense of this conclusion is especially apparent in
view of the other response that can be made to the inapplicability of
the Civilians Convention. Specifically, while the claim of no "legitimate
sovereign" implies that the Convention is designed to guard the inter-
ests of an ousted state as much as the interests of individuals affected
by the belligerent engaged in the ousting, it is clear that the parties to
the Convention had in mind only the latter. The Convention's Preamble
declares that the parties met at Geneva "for the purpose of establishing
a Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War."' 9
Indeed the official Commentary of the International Committee of the
Red Cross indicates the Convention was devoted "not to State interests,
but solely to the protection of the individual."20 Thus, to understand
the Convention as inapplicable whenever occupation is of lands under
de facto sovereignty alone completely frustrates the goal of the states-
parties in committing themselves to the Convention's obligations.
There is yet another difficulty with regard to invoking the Civilians
Convention that Professor Quigley did not mention. That is the conten-
tion that the Convention only applies in situations of normal occupa-
tion, and any occupation that has continued for more than a quarter of
a century cannot be considered normal. 2 ' By the terms of Article 1,
14. Quigley, supra note 1, at 230 n.53.
15. See Civilians Convention, supra note 7.
16. See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vols. 1, 1IA, IIB, and
Ill.
17. See Civilians Convention, supra note 7, at 3518.
18. See W. MALLISON AND S. MALLISON. THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 254-55 (1986).
19. See Civilians Convention, supra note 7, at 3518 (emphasis added),
20. 4 I.C.R.C. Commentary on the Civilians Convention 77 (Pictet ed. 1958) (emphasis
added).
2 1. See The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
1992]
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however, the parties to the Civilians Convention committed themselves
to respect the Convention "in all circumstances. "22 Presumably, then,
the exceptions to its obligations do not extend beyond those for which
provision may have been made. As if to reiterate its inclusive ambit,
the second paragraph of Article 2, in making the Convention applicable
to situations of belligerent occupation, provides that it shall "apply to
all cases of partial or total occupation. 23 The synergism of these two
provisions suggests that the parties to the Civilians Convention bound
themselves in advance to refrain from raising novel exceptions of the
sort here invoked.
An entirely different situation exists with regard to Article 43 of the
1907 Hague Regulations and its implicit prohibition of expulsion and
explicit direction to respect residency rights. The language of the provi-
sion contains references that would appear to make its invocation at
least problematic. The most obvious one is that both the requirement to
restore and ensure order and normal community life, as well as to re-
spect the laws in force in the occupied territory, are subject to a pro-
viso.24 Quigley references the proviso by excerpting the relevant lan-
guage "unless absolutely prevented," but then rapidly proceeds instead
to focus on the scope of Article 43's obligations. The generally accepted
understanding, however, is that the proviso means to permit departures
from those obligations where dictated by military necessity.25 Without
addressing the complicated and difficult fact assertions that would un-
doubtedly be involved in any dispute regarding the existence of military
necessity on the West Bank and Gaza, there is little question that the
concept should include consideration of the principal reasons for recog-
nizing the authority of the occupying belligerent: assurance of the se-
curity of the occupying forces, preservation of governmental structure
and order, and maintenance of stable community life. In this regard, a
distinguished international authority has indicated that article 43 con-
templates an occupying power restricting freedom of movement in rela-
tion to the occupied territory."
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1977) (statement of Yehuda Z. Blum).
22. Civilians Convention, supra note 7, art. I, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
23. Id. at art. 2.
24. See supra text accompanying note 9.
25. See H. LEVIE, 2 THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 715 (1985).
26. According to this authority:
There are certain types of municipal law prescriptions whose continued operation is com-
monly regarded as inconsistent in varying degrees with the military security interests of the
occupant and which, consequently, no one expects the occupant to respect and continue in
effect. Perhaps the clearest illustrations are the laws . . . which define the civil and politi-
cal rights and duties of the inhabitants vis-a-vis the legitimate sovereign, and which include
laws relating to . . . the right to leave the country or to travel freely within it.
See M. McDOtGAL AND F. FELICIANO. LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 757-58
(1961) (citations omitted). The fact that leaving is referenced necessarily touches on returning.
[Vol. 6:499
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There is an even more compelling reason to find the invocation of
Article 43 troublesome in connection with a right to return for 1967-
War Palestinians. Specifically, if one accepts that Jordan and Egypt
were unlawfully in control of those areas when the conflict began in
June of 1967, then there is language in Article 43 that would seem to
render the provision completely inapplicable. The opening words of the
article provide "[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant .. ." Professor Quigley does
not even obliquely allude to this notion. Unlike in Article 49 of the
Civilians Convention 28 however, it is clear the occupant's obligation
under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations relates to a "legitimate
power." In light of the fact that the reasons for recognizing an occupy-
ing belligerent's authority include the preservation of governmental
structure and order, this requirement of "legitimacy" makes some
sense. After all, if forces from states A, B and C were engaged in con-
flict with each other, and state C's forces overran B through the use of
aggression, it is the laws of B, and not those of C, that should be re-
stored when and if A later ousts C and itself occupies B.29
This idea of the imperativeness of a connection between the laws re-
stored and a state with a legitimate claim to sovereignty is made all the
more apparent by the fact that the provision immediately following Ar-
ticle 43 does not link a belligerent occupant's obligation with the need
for the territory occupied to be "territory of a legitimate power."' The
right of the ordinary citizen in occupied territory to be free from force
designed to compel disclosure of information about the army of the
other belligerent is so important it does not depend on the ousted power
having been legitimately in control of the territory. Conversely, the res-
toration of the laws in force in a country is so bound up with notions of
proper authority that legitimacy takes on paramount importance.
Further evidence of "legitimate power" being interpreted to require
that the ousted power has been lawfully in control of the territory now
occupied is found in the historical record of the development of Article
43. Beginning with the so-called Brussels Declaration of 1874, 31 and
27. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 43.
28. See supra text accompanying note 11.
29. In regard to whose laws apply during occupation, it is stated that:
The result of belligerent occupation, then, is that three distinct systems of law apply in
territory under an enemy occupant: the indigenous law of the legitimate sovereign, to the
extent that it has not been necessary to suspend it; the laws (legislation, orders, decrees,
proclamations, regulations) of the occupant, as such are gradually introduced; and the ap-
plicable rules of customary and conventional international law.
G. VoN GLAVIN. LAW AMONG NATIONS 669 (1965) (emphasis added)- If one of the sources of
applicable law is the law of the "legitimate sovereign," then the law of one not in that position has
no applicability.
30. See Hague Regulations, supra note 6, at 2306.
31. D. SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN, LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS. A COLLECTION OF CONVEN-
1992]
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continuing to the 1899 Hague Regulations,32 the conventional law lead-
ing up to Article 43 uniformly referred to the occupant's obligation as
one concerning the "legitimate power." This suggests that there was no
confusion on the part of the drafters of these statements, such that the
ousted power's legitimacy may not have been deemed essential. By re-
peatedly using the identical terminology, it would appear the predeces-
sors of Article 43 made clear that the provision means what it says.
Ill. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
What about the contention that a right of return can be based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration),3 3 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant),3 4 and the In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (Convention)? 3 5 To be sure, each of these venerable
statements of international human rights unequivocally and categori-
cally references such a right. Article 13,'paragraph 2, of the Declara-
tion provides "[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country."3 The 1966 Covenant states in
Article 12(4) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.""7 And the language of the fifth article of the
Convention provides in paragraph (d)(ii) for a right "to return to one's
country. '"38
The difficulties with basing a right of return for West Bank and
Gaza Strip Palestinians on these statements are twofold. First, as with
the previously discussed Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, two of
the statements of the right are conditioned by language recognizing the
rioNs. RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 25 (1973). Article 2 of the Brussels Declaration
states:
The authority of the legitimate Power being suspended and having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.
Id. at 27.
32. Convention with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, Annex:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, 32 Stat. 1803, 1821, 1
Bevans 247, 259. Article 43 provides:
The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occu-
pant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force.
Id.
33. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg., at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Declaration].
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Covenant].
35. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Convention].
.36. Declaration, supra note 33, art. 13, para. 2, at 74.
37. Covenant, supra note 34, art. 12(4), at 176.
38. Convention, supra note 35, art. 5(d)(ii), at 220.
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RIGHT TO RETURN
potential for exigencies that may neutralize the right's invocation. Arti-
cle 29, paragraph 2, of the Declaration speaks of the right being condi-
tioned by the "requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare . .."' And article 4(1) of the Covenant alludes to derogations
"[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion."'40 Though the phraseology of the Covenant is much more limiting
than that of the Declaration, both would seem to acknowledge that on
some occasions and in certain circumstances the right to return can be
compromised. Without attempting to pass judgment on the complex
question of whether such occasions and circumstances exist with regard
to 1967-War Palestinians, it cannot be denied that in instances where
they do exist the Declaration and the Covenant allow departure from
the rights they recognize.4"
There is no language of derogation contained in the Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Nonetheless, it faces the sec-
ond of the difficulties troubjing Quigley's reliance on human rights law.
Specifically, that difficulty concerns the fact that each of the previously
referenced provisions dealing with the right of return speaks in terms of
the right applying to the returnee's own country. That is to say, the
right seems to be one that can be invoked by nationals or citizens of the
state to which return is sought.42 Accepting that the. Palestinians who
fled or were removed from the West Bank and Gaza during the 1967
conflict are not or do not desire to become Israelis, the chances of suc-
cessfully invoking the right of return would appear minimal.
While the appeal of this argument is clear, it must nonetheless be
rejected. To begin with, neither the Declaration, nor the Covenant, nor
the Convention indicates that the right of return is linked to a person's
juridical status. Nowhere is it provided that a person's right is to "re-
turn to his state." Nowhere is it provided.that "a national has the right
... to return to his country." Such narrow formulations do not appear.
In each case the relevant language is drafted broadly to refer to "every-
39. G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 33, art. 29, para. 2, at 77. For a statement showing that
return under article 13, paragraph 2, can be conditioned by article 29, paragraph 2, see Study of
Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, including His Own,
and to Return to His Country, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/229/Rev. I at 38 (1963) [hereinafter Study].
40. Covenant, supra note 34, art. 4(1), at 174.
41. On derogations from human rights standards, see generally INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF
JURISTS. STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1983). Professor Quigley's
discussion of the problem of nationality or citizenship, supra note 1, at 235-36, is not tied to
specific language from the various human rights documents. Rather, the discussion seems to be in
regard to general international law. As a result, the reasons for his rejection of this as an insupera-
ble problem fail to extend much beyond citation to statements by New York Law School Professor
Lung-cha Chen at the 1973 Conference of the American Society of International Law. See
Quigley, id. at 235, note 83 and accompanying text.
42. See Lapidoth, The Right of Return in International Law, with Special Reference to the
Palestinian Refugees, 16 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 103, 114 (1986).
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one" having a right, to return to his "country," or "no one" being arbi-
trarily deprived of the right to return to his "country." Such breadth
seems all the more deliberate in view of the fact that each of the docu-
ments referencing the right obligates states to give the right effect
without regard to juridical status. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Decla-
ration says "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights [in the Declaration],
without discrimination of any kind, such as . . . national or social ori-
gin, . . . birth or other status.""3 Article 2(1) of the Covenant says each
party "undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory . . . the rights recognized . . . without distinction of any kind,
such as . . . national or social origin, ... birth or other status."4 And
the opening language of Article 5 of the Convention provides that par-
ties "undertake to . . . guarantee the right of everyone, without distinc-
tion as to . . . national or ethnic origin . . . ."' to return to his country.
Again, breadth is abundantly apparent.
Yet apart from the use of generous rather than tightly circumscribed
terms, there is another reason for rejecting the argument that return
only applies to nationals or citizens. More particularly, in each of the
very articles referencing the right of return, there is also reference to a
right of free movement within a "state." Articles 13, paragraph 1, of
the Declaration, 12(1) of the Covenant, and 5(d)(i) of the Convention
all provide that everyone shall have freedom of movement and resi-
dence within a "state."' 46 Given this, it would seem strange to interpret
any of these human rights documents (especially after the documents
had just used the term "state" in the context of free movement) as
using "country" in the context of the right of return to mean state. By
attributing a broader meaning to the latter term, one not only hits upon
an interpretation which comports with the dichotomy between "coun-
try" and "state," but also an interpretation consistent with the overall
thrust of some of the other provisions referenced above.
The final reason for rejecting the claim that the right to return enun-
ciated in the Declaration, Covenant, and Convention is applicable only
to nationals or citizens involves the negotiating record of Article 13,
paragraph 2, of the 1948 Universal Declaration, the seminal statement
of that right in human rights law. In particular, it appears that the
right of return was added to the Declaration more as a way of strength-
ening the right to leave, than as a statement of a right having its own
independent significance. Nevertheless, as the right is explicitly pro-
vided for, it is entitled to a stature all its own. When it was added to
43. Declaration, supra note 33, art. 2, para. I, at 72.
" 44. Covenant, supra note 34, art. 2(1).
45. Convention, supra note 35, art. 5.
46. See Declaration, supra note 33, art. 13, para. 1, at 74; see also Covenant, supra note 34,
art. 12(1): see also Convention, supra note 35, art. 5(d)(i).
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the Declaration, a statement made by the proposing delegate from Leb-
anon explained that it was offered so that "the right to leave a country,
already sanctioned in the article, would be strengthened by the assur-
ance of the right to return."'4 7 Of importance is the fact that the dele-
gate spoke of the right as applicable to a returnee's "country." Not
only does this track the very language of the Declaration's text, it indi-
cates the refusal to endorse formulations that base the right upon its
invocation by one seeking to return to one's state of nationality or
citizenship.
IV. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
Another source for the right of return is said to be general interna-
tional law.4" The idea put forward is that return of individuals to the
lands they have left is a right because the state to which the person has
gone has no obligation to accord them residency, and refusal to retake
the person inflicts a legal wrong on the state of refuge."9
The clearest and most explicit source of general international law
can be found in the customary legal practice of the states comprising
the community of nations. Inferences drawn from correlative principles,
like those on residency and refugees, can prove important, but can
never replace statements that directly and unequivocally touch the mat-
ter of relevance. When it comes to the right of return, a wonderfully
explicit exposition of that right is to be found in the Progress Report of
16 September 1948, prepared by Count Folke Bernadotte, the United
Nations Mediator for Palestine following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War."0
Attesting to both the existence of a right of return and its position as
an established customary norm, the Report refers, under the appella-
tion of "Right of Repatriation," to the fact that, "[t]he right of inno-
cent people . . . to return to their homes, should be affirmed.. ."" by
the United Nations (emphasis added). And later it again states, "[t]he
right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled
territory . ..should be affirmed by the United Nations . . " (empha-
sis added). 52
Apparently, as early as 1948, it was recognized by some that general
international law possessed, within its corpus, a customary principle as-
suring those who leave their homeland of a right to return. The Report
by Count Bernadotte did not speak of the right of innocent people to
return being created by future legislative action of the United Nations.
47. See Study, supra note 39, at 87.
48. See Quigley, supra note I, at 234-35.
49. Id.
50. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.. Supp. No. 11, at 1-19, U.N. Doc. A/648 (1948).
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id. at 18.
1992]
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It spoke of the right being affirmed." The Report did not speak of the
right of Arab refugees to return being proclaimed by subsequent reso-
lutions of the United Nations. It spoke of the affirmation of the right.54
In this sense, then, one can say some clear and apposite evidence of the
right of return long being acknowledged as a vibrant and extant part of
international law does indeed exist.
V. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
There are also difficulties that must be acknowledged when reliance
is placed on United Nations resolutions to support the existence of a
right of return. It is simply not enough to cite the appropriate resolu-
tions and quote the pertinent language. 5 The first of the difficulties is
that there is reason to believe that some of the U.N. resolutions refer-
enced by Quigley do not effectively speak to a right of return for Pales-
tinians who would like to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Even allowing that the basic Security Council Resolution on return is
binding and concerns 1967-War refugees, it fails to bind member states
to accept return, let alone return as a right. All that paragraph I of
Security Council Resolution 237 provides is that "Israel ...facilitate
the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area since the out-
break of hostilities."56 Nowhere is Israel obligated to "complete" or
"immediately and unconditionally effect" return. Nowhere is what
Israel must facilitate characterized as a "right" of return of those in-
habitants who have fled. In fact, it appears from the discussion sur-
rounding the unanimous adoption of 237 that the Security Council
sought to avoid any language that could be construed as an unequivocal
endorsement of a right of return."
In regard to the numerous General Assembly resolutions cited by my
colleague, 58 some contain language of undoubted concern. A few, like
Resolution 42/69G, speak of the right of return for those "displaced"
from homes or former places of residence in territories occupied by
Israel since 1967. 5" Others, like 3240A, speak of Israeli acts of "evacu-
53. See supra notes 51 and 52.
54. Id.
55. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 238-39.
56. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1361st mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2
(1967).
57. See i967 U.N.Y.B. 185-89 for discussion of resolution 237. During the deliberations on
what became 237, some spoke strongly in favor of "rights" of Palestinian Arabs. See id. at 186
(remarks of delegate from Saudi Arabia). Others spoke only of "Exerting every effort" on Israel
to allow Palestinians to return, see id. (remarks of delegate from the U.S.). The U.S.S.R. wished
for clear condemnation of Israeli aggression and forced withdrawal. See id. at 185, 188. In the
end, it was the proposed draft of Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia, that was accepted. Id. at 187.
58. See Quigley, supra note I, at 239, nn. 110-18.
59. G.A. Res. 42/69G, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at Ill, U.N. Doc. A/42/49
(1988).
[Vol. 6:499
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ation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhab-
itants of the occupied territories and the denial of their right to re-
turn.""0 Irrespective of the exact phraseology utilized, resolutions in
both groups apparently perceive the right to return as invocable by in-
dividuals who can demonstrate dispossession or ouster from property or
residence. Clearly, the resolutions do not envision a right that is gener-
ally available to all Palestinians. Thus, to the extent that one claiming
a right of return is unable to show he or she has somehow actually and
personally been removed from the territory to which return is sought,
reliance on resolutions like 42/69G or 3240A would seem misplaced.
Unlike the situation with Security Council Resolution 237,1 however,
that should not prove an insurmountable hurdle. Another entirely sepa-
rate line of General Assembly resolutions provides for a right of return
simply on the basis of being a Palestinian.12 As a consequence, relief
may well be available to those who can assert no stronger reason for
return than that they are of Palestinian heritage and desire to resettle
in their homeland.
The second of the difficulties concerns that other separate line of
General Assembly resolutions dealing with Palestinians and the right to
return that was alluded to above."a The most important of the resolu-
60. G.A. Res. 3240, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 63.
63. Almost none of these resolutions are cited by Professor Quigley. Quigley, supra note 1.
See e.g., G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); G.A. Res. 513,
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1951); G.A. Res. 614, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/2364 (1952); G.A. Res. 720, U.N. GAOR,
8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953); G.A. Res. 818, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 21, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 916, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp.
No. 19, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955); G.A. Res. 1018, U.N. GAOR, lIth Sess., Supp. No. 17,
at 6, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957); G.A. Res. 1191, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 8,
U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957); G.A. Res. 1315, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res. 1456, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/
4354 (1959); G.A. Res. 1604, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/4684
Add. 1 (1961); G.A. Res. 1725, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961): G.A. Res. 2002, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 6, U:N. Doc. A/5815 (1965);
G.A. Res. 2052, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A.
Res. 2154, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 21, U.N.- Doc. A/6711 (1966); G.A. Res.
2452A and B, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res.
2535A and B, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2963A and D, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972);
G.A. Res. 3089B, C and D, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 3331A and D, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3376, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.N.YB. 248; G.A Res. 3419B and C, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp.
No. 34, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 31/15A and D, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 39, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 31/20, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 39, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.N.Y.B. 245-46; G.A. Res.
32/90A and E, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); G.A.
Res. 33/28A, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45 at U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.N.Y.B. 342-43; G.A. Res. 34/70, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 21, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.N.Y.B. 375; G.A. Res. 35/169A, U.N. GAOR, 35th
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tions in the series can be read to provide a right to return to not only
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also to that part of Israel outside
those lands partitioned to it by the General Assembly in late 1947.64 As
this would compel the acceptance of individuals Israel is understanda-
bly not interested in taking in, the resolutions violate Article 2(1) of
the U.N. Charter by rendering meaningless the concept of "sovereign
equality" and are, therefore, invalid.6 5
The rationale for the argument of invalidity rests on Assembly reso-
lution references to "Palestine." This position was advanced a number
of years ago with regard to such a reference in Resolution 323666 and
could continue to be maintained today in light of Resolution 35/
169A's67 repeated recollection by other General Assembly resolutions. 8
The basic idea is that in the former Resolution, return is applied to
"Palestine," and "Palestine" can be read as referring to the areas taken
by Israel during the 1948 War, as well as to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.6" In the latter resolution, the applicability to both areas is made
absolutely explicit. Paragraph 5 reaffirms the "inalienable right of the
Palestinians to return to their homes and property in Palestine . . ."
and paragraph 7 "[sltrongly reaffirms" portions of a report from the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People setting forth a two phase return program; the first phase for the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the second for return to lands taken
from 1948 to 1967.70
Sess.. Supp. No. 48, at 26, U.N. Doc. No. A/35/48 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.N.Y.B. 393-95;
G.A. Res. 36/120D, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981),
reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 268; G.A. Res. 37/86E, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
36, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.N.Y.B. 414; UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL
ASSEMBL. ES-7/9, Question of Palestine, U.N. Doc. A/ES-7/14/Add.1 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.N.Y.B. 477; G.A. Res. 41/43A, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/41/
53 (1986), reprinted in 1987 U.N.Y.B. 271; G.A. Res. 42/66A, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 47, U.N. Doc. No. A/42/49 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.NY.B. 265.
64. On the partition, see G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947) (partitioning British-Mandated Palestine).
65. See Kurt Rene Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International
Law. 72 Ava J. INT'L L 586, 606-07 (1978) (making this argument with regard to G.A. Res.
3236).
66. G.A. Re's 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
See also Radley, supra note 65, at 606-08.
67. G.A. Res. 35/169A, supra note 63.
68. See e.g., G.A. Res. 41/43A, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1987). reprinted in 1986 U.N.Y.B..271 ("Recalling . . . 35/169").
69. The argument is essentially that resolution 3089D explicitly cross references resolution
194. Assembly resolution 194 provides in paragraph I I that refugees of the 1948 war "wishing to
return . . . should be permitted to do-so.'" G.A. Res. 194, supra note 63, at 24. Since Paragraph 3
of 3089D declares that peace in the Middle East depends upon the "enjoyment by the Palestine
Arab refugees of their right to return to their homes and property, recognized by the General
Assembly in resolution 194 ... ," the suggestion is that what might be characterized as an earlier
hortatory call for return by the Assembly was converted by 3089D into a "right." See G.A. Res.
3089D, supra note 63. The effect has been to apply the right to areas outside 181-Israel captured
during the 1948 War, as resolution 194 itself had applicability to such areas.
70. G.A. Res. 35f169A, supra note 63, at 26-27.
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Despite the unequivocal applicability of the right of return to por-
tions of present-day Israel, it seems inaccurate to dismiss the General
Assembly resolutions that refer to the right as nothing more than inva-
lid and violative of the Charter. The primary reason for this has to do
with the fact that the very notion of "sovereign equality," endorsed by
the Charter, is conditioned in this case by the 1947 General Assembly
partition instrument, Resolution 181.71 That is to say, in return for the
creation of an Independent Arab State and a Jewish State, to take the
place of the former British-Mandate, the principals involved agreed to
accept certain obligations. In this regard, the Plan of Partition with
Economic Union required each state to draft a constitution that would,
among other things, provide for: (1) universal suffrage; (2) settlement
of international disputes through peaceful means; (3) acceptance of the
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against territorial
integrity or political independence; (4) basic civil, political, economic,
religious, and human rights; and (5) freedom of transit and visit.7 2 Im-
plicit in these obligations is the idea that land allotted to the principals
involved was to be respected. That seems to be the essence of the re-
quirement to refrain from acts against territorial integrity and political
independence. Thus, the degree of equality among sovereigns that can
be expected in lands taken by Israel during the 1948 War seems re-
duced by what was originally envisioned for those lands.
VI. CONCLUSION: RIGHT TO RETURN LARGELY BASED ON
CUSTOMARY LAW
In light of the foregoing discussion of the right of return for West
Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, several preliminary conclusions
would seem warranted. Initially, although Article 43 of the 1907
Hague Regulations is inapplicable, Article 49 of the Geneva Civilians
Convention of 1949 would appear to apply, thus allowing claims that it
implicitly provides for a right of return. Next, the Universal Declara-
tion, the Covenant, and the Convention all seem to apply and allow
invocation of the right of return which human rights law recognizes. As
to general international law, there would certainly seem to be some
support for return as an established and long existing right. And fi-
nally, there is no doubt that many General Assembly resolutions have
declared the right of return for Palestinians interested in resettling on
the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip.
Notwithstanding the conclusions just enumerated, the case for return
is much less convincing than one might be led to believe. In large mea-
sure, this is because two of the three human rights documents relied on,
71. G.A. Res. 181, supra note 64.
72. Id. at 132-35.
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the Declaration and the Covenant, as well as all the General Assembly
resolutions on return, obtain their legal force through the concept of
customary international law. Yet it is incontrovertible that in assessing
whether such instruments from international organizations make cus-
tomary international law, reference must be made to the following:
(1) the number of states voting in support of the measure; (2) the
number and importance of those opposed; (3) the distribution of the
states on both sides and the directness of their interest in the matter
concerned; and, (4) the extant or likely practice of states in relation to
their voting position 73 Furthermore, measures not creating customary
law when adopted may, over time, pass into the corpus of customary
legal norms.7 4 States persistently objecting to the custom during its pe-
riod of development, however, will not be bound once the custom
crystallizes. 5
Judged by standards of this sort, it would seem virtually impossible
to demonstrate that the General Assembly resolutions referred to
herein create a customary law obligation, relative to return, which the
State of Israel is required to respect.76 At the very least, there can be
73. See Oscar Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 45-46 (1976). See also generally ROSALYN HIGGINS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); JORGE
CASTANEDA. LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969); OBED Y ASAMOAH, THE
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS (1966).
74. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Re-
vised). S102 at 36-38 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
75. For the two International Court of Justice decisions endorsing the idea of persistent objec-
tion, see Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18); Asylum Case (Colom, v.
Peru). 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (June 13).
76. See e.g., the voting on the resolutions addressing the West Bank and Gaza Strip: G.A.
Res. 32/40A, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978) (100 to
12, with 29 abstentions - Israel and the U.S. voting "no"; Canada, France, W. Germany, Italy,
Japan, U.K. and others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 3525A, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34,
at 41. U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) (87 to 7, with 26 abstentions - Israel and U.S. "no"; France,
W. Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, U.K. and others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 33/112F, U.N.
GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979) (115 to 4, with 22 abstentions
- much the same distribution as earlier resolutions); G.A. Res. 34/52E, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,
Supp. No. 46. at 74. U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) (121 to 3, with 16 abstentions - again, similar
distribution); G.A. Res. 35/169A, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/
35/48 (1980) (98 to 16, with 32 abstentions - same pattern); G.A. Res. 36/120D, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) (111 to 13, with 20 abstentions-
same pattern); G.A. Res. 37/88C, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1982) (112 to 2, with 21 abstentions - same pattern); G.A. Res. 38/79D, U.N. GAOR,
38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 95, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983) (115 to 2, with 27 abstentions -
same pattern, Israel and U.S. continuing to vote "no"); G.A. Res. 40/165G, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 129, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (127 to 2, with 23 abstentions - similar
pattern); G.A. Res. 42/69G, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at I 11, U.N. Doc. A/42/49
(1987) (125 to 2, with 27 abstentions - same pattern). The only marked departures with respect
to this series of resolutions were G.A. Res. 31/15D, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976) and G.A. Res. 32/90E, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Suoip. No. 45, at 68,
U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977). In the case of the former, the vote was 118 to 2, with 2 abstentions
- U.S. and Israel voting "no"; and only Malawi and Papua New Guinea abstaining. In the case
of the latter resolution the vote was 125 to 1, with 0 abstentions - U.S. voting "yes" and Israel
"no.' Even if one were to argue for a limited customary right of return on the basis of these two
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no doubt that it has repeatedly resisted efforts directed at the adoption
resolutions, there would be difficulties deriving not only from Israel's continuous refusal (as evi-
denced by its voting pattern) to recognize return as a right, see infra text accompanying note 77,
but also from the fact that a number of the states voting in favor of such a right either have, or
most likely would, refrain from giving effect to a similar right were they in a position of taking in
displaced peoples with strong ideological differences.
As to the voting on the line of more general resolutions dealing with return, the record since
1975 is as follows: G.A. Res. 3376, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/
10034 (1975) (93 to 18, with 27 abstentions - Canada, W. Germany, U.K., U.S. and Israel
"no"; France, Italy, Japan, Ireland, Sweden and/others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 31/20, U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976) (90-16-30 - much the same
pattern); G.A. Res. 32/40A, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977) (100-12-29 - same pattern); G.A. Res. 33/28A, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45,
at 16, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978) (97-19-25 - same pattern, U.S. and Israel "no"); G.A. Res.
34/70, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (102-17-20 -
same pattern); G.A. Res. 34/65A, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/
34/46 (1979) (117-14-16 - pattern continues); G.A. Res. 35/169A, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess.,
Supp. No. 48, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980) (98-16-32 - similar distribution, with US and
Israel voting "no"); G.A. Res. 36/120D, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 27, U.N. Doc.
A/36/51 (1981) (111-13-20 - same pattern); G.A. Res. 37/86E, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) (123-2-19 - U.S. and Israel voting "no"); UNITED
NATIONS. GENERAL ASsEMBLY: ES-7/9, Question of Palestine; U.N. Doc. A/ES-7/14/Add.l
(1982) reprinted in 1982 U.N.Y.B. 477. (147-2 - only U.S- and Israel not voting "yes"); G.A.
Res. 41/43A, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986) (121-2-
21 - same pattern); G.A. Res. 42/66A, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 47, U.N. Doc.
A/42/49, (1987) (131-2-22 - same pattern).
For resolutions adopted prior to 1975 the record looks like this: G.A. Res. 513, U.N. GAOR,
6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952) (47-0-7: no roll call); G.A. Res. 614,
U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952) (48-0-6: no roll call); G.A.
Res. 720A, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953) (52-0-5: no roll
call); G.A. Res. 818, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954) (48-
0-7: no roll call); G.A. Res. 916, UN. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/3116
(1955) (38-0-17: no roll call); G.A. Res. 1018, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/3572 (1957) (68-0-1: no roll call); G.A. Res. 1191, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No.
18. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957) (52-0-19: no roll call); G.A. Res. 1315, U.N. GAOR, 13th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958) (57-0-20: no roll call); G.A. Res. 1456, U.N.
GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959) (80-0-1: no roll call); G.A. Res.
1604, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (1961) (37-17-38:
Israel voting "no," Canada,'Japan, Italy, etc. "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 1725, U.N. GAOR, 16th
Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) (62-0-37: Israel voting "yes"). With regard
to the resolutions spanning the years 1951-1961, Israel would sometimes abstain and sometimes
vote affirmatively. For an affirmative vote in a non-roll call setting, see 6 YB. of U.N. 260-61
(1952) (Israeli representative indicating an affirmative vote). The reach of the resolutions adopted
during this time frame, however, only covers supporting efforts to obtain repatriation, compensa-
tion or resettlement. The resolutions did not deal with Palestinian "rights." On the Israeli under-
standing that this was the case, see e.g., 1953 U.N.Y.B. 242-43; 1963 U.N.Y.B. 158. Thus, the
fact that it did not vote "no" on each of these resolutions, does not operate in favor of the creation
of a custom binding Israel.
From 1961 to 1975 the record shows voting on the more general resolutions was as follows:
G.A. Res. 2002, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1965) (no
objections) (resolution does not speak of "rights"); G.A. Res. 2052, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (91-1-7: U.S. voting "yes," Israel "no") (resolu-
tion parallels those from 1951-61, however); G.A. Res. 2154, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (68-0-39: no roll call) (again, no mention of "rights"); G.A.
Res. 2452A, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (101-1-6: no
roll call); G.A. Res. 2452B, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968) (105-0-3: no roll call) (resolution is another to not mention "rights"); G.A. Res. 2535A,
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (no objections) (basi-
cally replicates resolutions not mentioning "rights"); G.A. Res. 25351, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (48-22-47: Israel voting "no"); G.A. Res. 2963D,
U.N. GAOR. 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972) (93-5-26: Israel voting
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of resolutions containing such a right.7" Thus, even accepting that the
resolutions speak of a right for all Palestinians to return to areas that
include the West Bank and Gaza, they really prove little more benefi-
cial than Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.
Reliance on general international law to support a right of return is
not without problems of its own. Specifically, the customs and practices
of which it is comprised are not uniformly regarded as having estab-
lished a principle that can be invoked by aliens or non-nationals. It is
beyond dispute that statements of the establishment of such a principle
can be found.78 But occasionally even the sources relied on have prof-
fered conflicting statements,79 and others have made it crystal clear
that they do not believe a right of return exists in general international
law for those who are unable to demonstrate a nationality link.8 0 The
breadth of the language used in human rights documents like the Uni-
versal Declaration, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (e.g., "every-
one" and "country") -may suggest movement away from any tight
linkage required by the traditional law.81 Furthermore, to some extent
it may be that commentators who speak in terms of coverage for non-
nationals express an aspiration as much as anything else. Nonetheless,
in the absence of some consensus about the right of return being appli-
cable to individuals situated like the Palestinians., it would seem diffi-
cult to fashion a persuasive case on the basis of general international
law.
Having said all of this, arguments for return therefore have to be
based on inferences drawn from Article 49 of the Civilians Convention,
or from.the explicit provisions for return found in the aforementioned
..no," U.S., Portugal, and others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 3089C, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
No. 30, at 27. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (110-4-12: Israel voting "no," U.S., Canada, Portugal,
and others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 3089D, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 27, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973) (87-6-33: Israel and U.S. voting "no," Canada, France, W. Germany, U.K.
and others "abstaining"); G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974) (89-8-37: U.S. and Israel "no," U.K., France, W. Germany, and others
"abstaining").
77. See supra note 76.
78. Quigley cites Expulsion and Expatriation in International Law: The Right to Leave, to
Stay, and to Return, 67 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 122, 127-31 (1973) (remarks of Lung-chu
Chen stating that the "prime exception is to allow long-term residents (non-nationals) to return to
the land of domicile").
79. See id. at 130 (Lung-chu Chen noting 1972 Uppsala Declaration directed at extending
existing law so as to include non-nationals). See also id. at 132 (Lung-chu Chen noting "present
state of practice ...leaves much to be desired. Pending the achievement of a world common-
wealth ...the right to return . . . should be extended from nationals to all other persons who
have significant ties" with a community).
80. See id. at 137, 138 (comments of Sidney Liskofsky stating that the "'existing international
standard ...limits the right to return to nationals").
81. See generally McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, The Protection of Aliens from Discrimina-
tion and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 Am. J.
INT'L L 432, 456-67 (1976).
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Declaration, Covenant, and Convention. With particular regard to
these three human rights documents, one might with some degree of
confidence conclude that the evidence supporting return is stronger
than under either general international law or the United Nations reso-
lutions. This does not mean, however, a clean and unavoidable case can
be made from these sources.
There is no question that the Declaration and the Covenant may
have become a part of the corpus of existing customary international
law.82 And while the Declaration was adopted by the United Nations
prior to the time of the membership of the State of Israel, the Cove-
nant was adopted thereafter with a vote of approval being cast by that
state and many others."3 As for the Convention, Israel has accepted its
terms, taking a reservation only to an article which has no specific im-
pact on the provision dealing with return.8 Consequently, whether ex-
amined from the perspective of customary or conventional legal obliga-
tion, Israel would seem bound to accept the right of Palestinian return.
However, to the extent that the constant refusal of the State of Israel
to accept U.N. resolutions aimed at the return of Palestinians, a refusal
voiced repeatedly from at least the time of Israel's acquisition of mem-
bership in the United Nations," is seen as evidence of an unequivocal
and distinct position regarding the requirements of the Declaration,
Covenant and Convention, it might well be that Israel's refusal serves
to modify its international legal obligations. Under traditional analysis,
persistent objection frees one from customary standards, and bona fide
reservation works the same effect on standards of a conventional sort.
During an era when the formulation and development of international
law has shifted away from an emphasis on state practice towards an
emphasis on the promulgation of declarations, resolutions and multilat-
eral conventions by international organizations, the fact that a clear
and constant opposition has been voiced in one context to a concept
that is somehow implicated in an entirely different context may be suf-
ficient to stand in place of persistent objection or reservation.8 If it is,
82. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1982);,F. NEWMAN AND D. WEISSBROOJT INTER-
NATIONAl- HUMAN. RIGHTS 617 (1990) (citing Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F-2d 1439 .(9th Cir. 1989)).
83. On approval from all states then in being, see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MAT-RIALS 471 (3d ed. 1971).
84. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, 103 at 108, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/5 (1987).
85. See The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Pt. IP" 1947-1977, at 51, U.N.
Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/I Part 11 (1978) (referencing Israel's refusal as early as 1949 to concede on
the return question). See also F. KHOURI. THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 127 (1968) (indicating
that as early as June of 1948 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was taking a "no return" position).
86. The question raised by this speculation is well beyond the scope of the present Comment.
For similar questions raised with regard to persistent objection alone, see Ted L. Stein, The Ap-
proach of the Difjerent Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457, 475-81 (1985).
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then Palestinian return to the West Bank and Gaza must rest exclu-
sively on Article 49 of the Civilians Convention. If it is not, then
human rights law may be invoked as well.
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